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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Draper City (hereinafter *City') challenges the 
Defendant's claim the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
in this matter. Jurisdiction of this appeal is governed by 
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120(7), eff. April 30, 2001. 
This case is an appeal from a Third District Court's 
Judgment in a trial de novo from Draper Justice Court. 
Therefore, the above statutory scheme applies to appellate 
review. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
In summary, Defendant challenges his conviction in the 
Draper Justice Court and the Third District Court for the 
traffic offense of a stop sign violation. Defendant 
inappropriately claims the City may not amend an Information 
alleging the traffic offense from a Class *Cf Misdemeanor to 
an Infraction. 
The Defendant is also in error that the Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to review the Third District Court's 
decision. 
1. The Court of Appeals Jurisdiction Is Limited to 
Reviewing District Court Rulings on the 
Constitutionality of a Statute or Ordinance. 
1 
The standard of review for cases originating from 
Justice Courts is found in City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 
P.2d 981, 982 (Utah 1987), Kanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 
1066 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
2* - The District Court Rulings Denying Discovery, a 
Jury Trial for an Infraction, and Refusing to 
Recuse the Trial Judge, Are Not Reviewable. 
The standard of review for District Court decisions that 
involve a constitutional issue on a procedural matter is 
governed by Kanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) and City of St. George v. Smith, 814 P.2d 1154, 
1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
3. In the Event Defendant Can Establish This Court's 
Jurisdiction, This Appeal Is Governed by West 
Valley City, v. McDonald. 
Should this Court determine it has jurisdiction to 
review the District Court's verdict, the appropriate review 
is identical to West Valley City, v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutes that are determinative of this appeal are: 
Utah Code Annotated §78-5-120(2001),Appeals from 
justice court - Trial or hearing de novo in district 
court. 
(7) The decision of the district court is final and may 
not be appealed unless the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case originated in the Draper Justice Court with a 
traffic citation for a stop sign violation issued to the 
Defendant. (R.l) The Defendant was found guilty after a 
bench trial. The Defendant was sentence with the 
standardized fine of $60.00. He made a timely appeal to the 
Third District Court, Sandy Division. 
A trial de novo occurred on March 13, 2001. After a 
bench trial, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 
a $60.00 fine. Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial 
(R.96) (the timeliness of the Motion is disputed)1 and the 
same was denied by the District Court on April 30, 2001. 
(R.102-4) The Defendant filed this appeal on May 7, 
2001.(R.105) 
Course of the Proceedings 
The Draper City Ordinances adopted the state traffic 
code as the traffic code for the City. Pursuant to those 
1The City does not stipulate that Defendant's Motion for New 
Trial is filed in a timely manner. Without argument, the City 
will submits the matter to the Court of Appeals. Whereas the 
Defendant's Certificate of Service (R.97) differs with the 
District Court's Ruling (R.102) and in an effort to avoid a 
remand for further findings, the City avers the absence of 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal will ultimately control the case. 
3 
ordinances the Defendant received a traffic citation on May 
5, 2000 for failing to stop at a stop sign in violation of 
41-6-72(10). (R.l) Mr. Barlow requested a formal information 
on May 19, 2000, prior to entering a plea.(R.4-5) On June 2, 
2000 an Information was filed and a new arraignment was 
scheduled for June 13, 2001.(R.7-8,6) 
The Information amended the Class yC Misdemeanor to an 
Infraction, by inter lineation from the Justice Court Judge. 
(R.7-8,25,54) The Defendant also sought from the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office various documents pursuant to a 
Subpoena Duces Tecum. (R.27) The Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office moved to quash the request (R. 31) which 
was ultimately granted by the Justice Court. 
A bench trial was held and at the request of the 
Defendant, the Justice Court viewed the intersection in 
issue. The defendant was found guilty (R.42) and fined 
$60.00 (R.50) 
The Defendant appealed to the Third District Court, 
Sandy Division. The Defendant again asserted his claim for 
a jury trial (R.65), more discovery (R.63-4), and ultimately 
requested the Trial Court Judge to recuse herself. (R.76) 
These issues were reviewed prior to the first scheduled 
4 
trial date, and denied. (R.65,78,81-3) 
A bench trial was held on March 13, 2001. The City 
presented one witness, the citing officer. (R.91-2) The 
defense did not offer any witnesses.(R. 91-2,Tr.21) Upon the 
conclusion of evidence, the Defendant was found guilty. 
(R.92) The Defendant requested sentencing be set over and 
the same occurred on March 27th. At that time, the Defendant 
received a $60.00 fine. 
The Defendant's pleadings for a New Trial asserts he 
served the same on April 6th, (R.96-7) within the ten (10) 
days required by the Rule 24(a) Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
The City has no knowledge why the Defendant's pleadings 
bear a filing date of April 23rd. For the purpose of this 
brief, the City will assume the Notice of Appeal is timely. 
A decision in favor of the City's position that the Court of 
Appeals has no jurisdiction would finalize the matter 
without regard to the timeliness of the Appeal. 
Trial Court Disposition 
On April 30, 2001, the District Court denied the 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial (R.102-3) and affirmed 
the conviction as an Infraction. The District Court imposed 
5 
the same sentence as the Draper Justice Court, a $60.00 
fine. The Defendant filed this appeal on May 7, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above recitation of the Course of Proceedings and 
Trial Court Disposition provide the relevant facts on 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellate jurisdiction over cases originating in Justice 
Courts is limited by the Utah Code Annotated §78-5-
120(7)(2001). This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
repeatedly held only District Court rulings upon the 
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute are subject to 
further review. Otherwise, all District Court findings are 
final. 
The Defendant herein has challenged his conviction on a 
traffic offense. He neither preserved a constitutional 
issue at the trial court nor did the District Court rule 
upon the constitutionality of an Ordinance. Therefore, this 
Court should dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
In the alternative should the Court believe judicial 
review is appropriate, the Utah Court of Appeals previously 
reviewed and denied the identical claims presented by 
6 
defendant herein, in West Valley City, v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 
371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In McDonald, the Court summarily 
dismissed the Defendant's claim regarding his constitutional 
right to a jury trial. 
Finally, the facts as presented in this appeal do not 
attach the right of a jury trial. Whereas the Draper 
Justice Court tried the case and imposed no jail, the 
District Court could not impose any greater punishment on 
appeal. Therefore, whatever error the defendant could 
sustain on appeal, the error is harmless. Based upon the 
Draper Justice Court sentence to only a fine, incarceration 
was prohibited on appeal. Therefore, the worst possible 
sentence from his trial de novo in the District Court would 
be a $60.00 fine. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL DO NOT VEST APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION. 
SUBPOINT A 
ONLY DISTRICT COURT RULINGS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A 
STATUTE OR ORDINANCES ARE REVIEWABLE. 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held appellate jurisdiction is limited regarding cases 
7 
originating in the Justice Courts. This anailysis is upheld 
by the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120(7), eff. 
2001. 
(7) The decision of the district court is final and may 
not be appealed unless the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. 
In reviewing this statute, the Utah Supreme Court held 
in City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 
1990) that: 
This simply recognizes the well-settled principle that 
it is within the legislature's prerogative to define 
court's appellate jurisdiction over decisions from any 
lower court so long as such jurisdiction is not 
expressly prohibited by the state constitution, 
(citations omitted) at 518. 
This Court has also similarly held in several dismissals 
of appeals of a de novo review. State v. Hinson 966 P.2d 
273, 276 (Utah Ct. App 1998) upheld dismissing an appeal 
from a trial de novo. In Hinson, the Utah Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal even though the defendant claimed the 
District Court erred in denying certain discovery to the 
defendant. 
In City of Monticello v. Christiansen, 769 P.2d 853, 855 
Utah Ct. App. 1989) this Court dismissed a trial de novo 
conviction in the face of the defendant's inarticulate claim 
that his traffic violation was unconstitutionally applied to 
him. 
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City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 981, 982 (Utah 1987) 
held that defendant's claim that a driver's license was an 
unconstitutional infringement upon his right to travel was 
not sufficient to vest appellate jurisdiction in light of 
the plain language of the statute, redes. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-5-120(7) (2001) . 
In the case at bar, the defendant never challenged a 
statute or ordinance. The defendant's main complaint is 
against the procedure permitting the prosecutor to reduce 
the traffic offense from a class yC Misdemeanor to an 
Infraction. He made a bare reference to that issue in the 
Draper Justice Court and in the District Court. 
His second complaint is that full discovery was not 
provided to him prior to trial. It appears from the 
appellant's brief he primarily complains of not receiving a 
Bill of Particulars. What is obviously omitted from 
Appellant's discovery complaints is how the ^Information' i 
deficient or confusing in regard to the traffic offense of 
stop sign violation. Both the Justice Court and the 
District Court reviewed these claims and found them to be 
without merit.(R.54,65) 
In the absence of a ruling on the constitutionality of 
statute, this Court should dismiss the appeal for want of 
jurisdiction. 
SUBPOINT B 
DEFENDANT'S SIMILAR CLAIMS OF ERROR ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Although the defendant arguably claims his 
constitutional rights were violated by the trial de novo 
process, such claims fail to establish appellate 
jurisdiction. As already noted, the Utah appellate courts 
have consistently refused to review de novo trial appeals 
unless a specific constitutional ruling validated or 
challenged a statute or ordinance. The Utah Courts have 
dismissed appeals claiming constitutional errors on a Motion 
to Suppress, Kanab v. Guskey 965 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998); refusal of the District Court to declare a 
parking ordinance unconstitutional, Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Leahy, 848 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); or an 
erroneous ruling regarding pretrial discovery, State v. 
Hinson 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App 1998). 
Although Defendant herein may claim these alleged 
procedural errors rise to a constitutional deprivation, the 
same is still non-reviewable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
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5-120(7) (2001), also see City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 
981, 982 (Utah 1987) . 
As for the Defendant's claim the Trial Judge failed to 
recuse herself, the record clearly shows the matter was 
reviewed by the Presiding Judge, Robin W. Reese.(R.82) This 
issue also fails to meet the procedural or substantive basis 
for appellate review. 
As for the merits of the matter, the Defendant fails to 
differentiate between receiving unfavorable pretrial rulings 
with the alleged bias against the defendant. The record is 
void of such bias. 
SUBPOINT C 
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT BELIEVES APPELLATE REVIEW IS 
APPROPRIATE, WEST VALLEY CITY V. MCDONALD, CONTROLS THE 
ISSUE. 
Should this Court believe reviewing this case is 
appropriate, the same issues were determined by West Valley 
City, v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). (See 
Addendum, A) In that case, a defendant with the assistance 
of counsel, claimed that the City Prosecutor did not have 
the authority to reduce a speeding charge from a Class yC 
Misdemeanor to an ^Infraction'. The Utah Court of Appeals 
found that such a reduction was not a violation of the 
federal constitution in that no right to jury trial attaches 
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to petty crimes (less than six months potential jail). At 
374. 
The Utah Court of Appeals further found that the 
defendant did not preserve the Utah State Constitutional 
right simply by making a claim at the lower court. The same 
deficiency lies in the case at bar. Although the Defendant 
did claim his Utah State Constitutional right to a jury 
trial,(R.22-3) his total argument is contained in the 
following: 
7. The case of West Valley City v. McDonald is 
clearly distinguishable from this case by the Utah Court 
of Appeals analysis as follows: [Quotation omitted] 
8. The defendant in this case is raising a state 
constitutional argument at the trial court on the state 
level, and therefore, an analysis in the Utah Court of 
Appeals would be under the Utah State Constitution not 
under the Federal Constitution. (R.22-3) 
The Utah Court of Appeals has previously established 
what constitutes ^raising a constitutional question'. In 
State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this 
Court followed the long held analysis that mere mention is 
not sufficient to preserve a Utah State Constitutional 
claim. In Dudley, the Defendant, with the assistance of 
counsel, made mention of his State Constitutional claim in 
support of his motion to suppress. However, the Utah Court 
of Appeals made the following observation at 42 6. 
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Although the appellants assert their state 
constitutional rights have been violated, they failed to 
develop any meaningful argument under the Utah 
Constitution. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure provides: *The argument shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, with citation to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on/ Mere allusion to state constitutional 
claims, unsupported by meaningful analysis, does not 
permit appellate review. (Citations omitted) "Moreover, 
the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and 
probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation 
is before the trial court, not ...for the first time on 
appeal." State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) 
In the instant case, Mr. Barlow omitted any citations to 
any cases supporting his proposition at either trial court 
below. He omits any analysis why the Utah State 
Constitution right to a jury trial attached in his case. 
Mr. Barlow further omitted any analysis of this claim in 
Appellant's Brief (Appellant's Brief, p.10). In summary, 
Mr. Barlow's bare citation to the state constitution is not 
a ^thoughtful and probing analysis' as required in Bobo, id. 
and Dudley, id. 
SUBPOINT D 
IN THIS CASE, THE DEFENDANT SUFFERED ZERO RISK OF 
INCARCERATION, AND THEREFORE HAD NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. 
Once the Draper Justice Court limited the Defendant's 
sentence to a fine, it precluded any possibility of 
13 
incarceration. As in all appeals, the District Court herein 
was limited to impose no more harsh sentences than imposed by 
the Justice Court. Since sentencing was limited to a fine, 
($60.00) the District Court on a de novo trial is limited to 
a fine not to exceed $60.00. Therefore, no possibility of 
incarceration existed after the Draper Justice Court imposed 
sentence on the Infraction. 
Therefore, without a risk of depriving the defendant of 
his liberty, no right to jury trial attached at the District 
Court level. The defendant/s claim of a constitutional 
right to a jury trial simply became moot upon sentencing at 
the Draper Justice Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate review of a trial de novo case originating in 
Justice Courts is traditionally limited to constitutional 
challenges. Such a challenge must attack a statute or 
ordinance and does not include alleged procedural defects in 
the progression of the case. 
Should this Court choose to pursue an analysis of the 
Defendant's claims, that analysis is controlled by West 
Valley City v. McDonald, id. This Court has already ruled 
on the identical issues presented in the case at bar. 
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Ultimately, no matter what analysis may be appropriate, 
the defendant's claims are rendered moot by the sentence 
imposed at the Justice Court level. Once a fine was 
imposed, the defendant could not suffer any deprivation of 
liberty in a subsequent trial de novo or other appeal. 
Therefore, Mr. Barlow's real claim for a jury trial never 
attached after receiving his sentence of $60.00. 
The Defendant's appeal should be summarily dismissed. 
Dated this _>/^ l„_ day of November, 2001. 
^T G. CUTLER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, by 
first class mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, on this /dT 
day of November, 2001, to Matthew I. Barlow, at 12624 South 
Whisper Brook Way, Draper, Utah 84120. 
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PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE' S 
ADDENDUM A 
WEST VALLEY CITY V. MCDONALD 
948 P.2D 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
17 
WEST PALLET CITY v. McDONALD 
Cite as 948 P.2d 371 (UtahApp. 1997) 
a disconnection action 
Utah 371 
229. In Mesa's case 
would not be merely "a substitute procedure 
for attacking an annexation." Id. Rather, it 
would air Mesa's grievance in a forum that, 
unlike the current annexation challenge, is 
explicitly designed to allow public debate on 
the policy implications of altering established 
city boundaries. 
In sum, the principles of statutory con-
struction require us to presume that the 
Legislature used the terms "property owner" 
and "resident" advisedly to describe two dis-
tinct categories of potential plaintiffs under 
the annexation statute. See Cottonwood City 
Electors, 28 Utah 2d at 124, 499 P.2d at 272. 
We conclude the Legislature did not contem-
plate that "residents" under section 10-2-423 
would include nonresident property owners. 
On the contrary, Mesa's claim—in which the 
absentee owner of a single undeveloped lot 
raises procedural defects to invalidate the 
annexation of an entire residential neighbor-
hood—is clearly preempted by the statute's 
plain language. We conclude that, based on 
the presumption of validity in section 10-2-
423, Sandy City's annexation of Mesa's prop-
erty was valid. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1997 amendments to the annexation 
statute do not apply retroactively to Sandy 
City's 1993 annexation of Mesa's property, 
and thus Mesa's claims are not moot. How-
ever, Mesa is not a resident of the annexed 
area under section 10-2-422 and cannot over-
come that section's conclusive presumption of 
valid annexation. Sandy City's annexation of 
Mesa's property is therefore valid regardless 
of any procedural defect. 
GREENWOOD, J., concurs. 
ORME, J., concurs in the result. 
WEST VALLEY CITY, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Caree F. McDONALD, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 960471-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
Nov. 14, 1997. 
Motorist was convicted, in the Third Dis-
trict Court, West Valley Department, Carlos 
A. Esqueda, Judge pro tern., of speeding 
infraction. Motorist appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by fining motorist 
$60 for speeding, rather than $50 as recom-
mended in Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule; (2) 
reduction of speeding charge against motor-
ist from class C misdemeanor to infraction 
did not deny federal constitutional right to 
trial by jury; (3) reduction of speeding 
charge did not violate state statutory right to 
trial by jury; (4) reduction of speeding 
charge did not violate rule of criminal proce-
dure; and (5) reduction of speeding charge 
did not violate statutory requirement of uni-
form enforcement of traffic laws. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>586 
District court does not abuse its discre-
tion in denying continuance unless denial was 
arbitrary or unreasonable. 
2. Automobiles <s=>359 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by fining motorist $60 for speeding, rather 
than $50 as recommended in Uniform Fine/ 
Bail Schedule; motorist failed to show trial 
court's act was inherently unfair, that fine 
was clearly excessive, or that no reasonable 
person would accept trial court's decision. 
U.C JL1953, 41-6-46, 76-3-301.5(5). 
3. Indictment and Information <®=>162 
Reduction of speeding charge against 
motorist from class C misdemeanor to infrac-
tion did not charge motorist with additional 
372 Utah 948 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
or different offense, in violation of rule of 
criminal procedure; only classification and 
penalty for speeding offense was changed. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-46, 76-3-204(3), 76-3-
301(l)(e); Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 4(d). 
4. Jury <3=>22(1), 31.3(1) 
Reduction of speeding charge against 
motorist from class C misdemeanor to infrac-
tion did not deny motorist's statutory right to 
jury trial for misdemeanor, and thus did not 
violate rule of criminal procedure by preju-
dicing motorist's substantial rights; once mo-
torist was charged with infraction, she could 
no longer be punished by imprisonment and 
no longer had statutory right to jury trial. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-46, 76-3-204(3), 76-3-
301(l)(e), 77-l-6(2)(e); Rules Crim.Proc., 
Rule 4(d). 
5. Jury ®=>22(1) 
Constitutional right to jury trial is trig-
gered by type of punishment defendant 
faces. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
6. Jury <8=>22(1), 31.3(1) 
Reduction of speeding charge against 
motorist, from class C misdemeanor carrying 
possible jail penalty to infraction that could 
not be punished by imprisonment, did not 
violate statutory right to jury trial; trial 
court, by accepting amended information be-
fore trial, in effect agreed not to consider jail 
time as possible sentence for speeding viola-
tion, so trial court was no longer required 
under Utah law to grant motorist's request 
for jury trial. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-46, 76-3-
204(3), 76-3-301(l)(e), 77-l-6(2)(e); Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rule 4(d). 
7. Indictment and Information <&=>161(1) 
Statute requiring enforcement of traffic 
laws uniformly throughout the state did not 
address issue of whether trial court may 
allow information charging defendant with 
speeding violation to be amended from mis-
demeanor to infraction. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-
16. 
8. Jury <3>22(1) 
Utah statute denying right to jury trial 
for infraction does not violate right to jury 
trial guaranteed under Federal Constitution; 
infractions are "petty" offenses carrying no 
prison term, for which defendant has no fed-
eral constitutional right to jury trial 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; U.C.A.1953, 77-1-
6(2)(e). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions 
9. Criminal Law <s=>1030(2) 
Defendant failed to properly raise state 
constitutional issue before trial court, and 
Court of Apioeals would not consider state 
constitutional claims; none of defendant's mo-
tions before trial court referred to constitu-
tional argument, that Utah statute denying 
right to jury trial for infraction violates Utah 
Constitution because Constitution provides 
for jury trial in all criminal proceedings, nor 
was argumert raised in trial court proceed-
ings for which Court of Appeals had tran-
scripts. Const. Art. 1, § 12; U C.A.1953, 77-
l-6(2)(e). 
10. Criminal Law <s=>1030(2) 
When appellant does not brief state con-
stitutional arj^ument below, Court of Appeals 
will not address it, but rather will analyze 
alleged violation under Federal Constitution. 
11. Jury <e=>22(l) 
Defendant charged with petty offense 
has no federal constitutional right to jury 
trial. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 6. 
12. Criminal Law <S=>27 
Legislature's determination that offense 
carries maximum prison terms of six months 
or less indicates its view that offense is "pet-
ty." 
13. Jury &=>22(1> 
Infractions and class C misdemeanors 
are "petty" offenses for which defendant has 
no federal constitutional right to jury trial; 
infractions carry no prison term under Utah 
law, and class C misdemeanors carry maxi-
mum prison term of six months or less. 
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 6. 
Michael A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
J. Richard Catten, West Valley City, for 
Plaintiff and Appellee. 
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Before DAVIS, P.J., WILKINS, Associate 
P.J., and BILLINGS, J. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Caree F. McDonald appeals 
from a conviction of exceeding the speed 
limit in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
46 (Supp.1997). We affirm. 
FACTS 
McDonald received notice that West Valley 
City (the City) was charging her with a 
speeding violation, based on "photo radar," 
for traveling fifty-one miles per hour in a 
forty mile-per-hour zone. The notice stated 
bail was fifty-seven dollars. Counsel for Mc-
Donald subsequently entered a notice of ap-
pearance and a request for jury trial. 
The City filed an information formally 
charging McDonald with exceeding the^ post-
ed speed by eleven miles per hour, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of section 41-6-46. 
After the case was set for a bench trial, 
McDonald again requested a jury trial. The 
City then filed an amended information con-
taining the same speeding charge against 
McDonald, but stating the violation was an 
infraction rather than a class C misdemean-
or. 
On the day of trial, the court heard argu-
ments on McDonald's motion and denied 
both her request for a jury trial and for a 
continuance, but agreed to sentence Mc-
Donald only to the penalties appropriate for 
an infraction. Trial proceeded, and Mc-
Donald was found guilty as charged. The 
trial court sentenced McDonald to pay a 
sixty dollar fine and attend traffic school. 
1. McDonald also asserts the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant a continuance. 
McDonald has failed to show the denial was 
unreasonable or arbitrary, as required by Utah 
law. See State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 
(Utah Ct.App.1997). We therefore find no abuse 
of discretion. 
McDonald further contends the trial court 
abused its discretion by fining her $60 rather 
than $50 as recommended in the Uniform Fine/ 
Bail Schedule. Because McDonald fails to show 
ANALYSIS 
[1,2] McDonald argues on appeal that 
when the trial court allowed the City to 
reduce the speeding violation charge from a 
class C misdemeanor to an infraction, the 
trial court violated Rule 4(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure because reduc-
ing the charge deprived McDonald of her 
statutory right to a jury trial. McDonald 
further argues the City does not have the 
authority under Utah law to change the clas-
sification of a speeding violation from a class 
C misdemeanor to an infraction. In addition, 
McDonald argues Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-
6(2)(e) (1995), which does not allow jury trials 
for defendants charged with an infraction, 
violates Utah's constitution.1 
I. Rule 4(d) 
[3,4] A trial court may allow the prose-
cution to amend a charge against a defendant 
at any time before the defendant is convicted 
"if no additional or different offense is 
charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 4(d). The original information 
charging McDonald classified the violation as 
a class C misdemeanor, which is punishable 
by a maximum of ninety days imprisonment 
and a $750 fine. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-204(3) (1995). The amended information 
classified McDonald's violation as an infrac-
tion, which is punishable by a maximum fine 
of $750. See id. § 76-3-301 (l)(e). Utah law 
provides for a jury trial for criminal defen-
dants except when charged with an infrac-
tion. See id. § 77-l-6(2)(e); Utah R.Crim. 
P. 17(d). 
The charge in the amended information— 
speeding in violation of section 41-6-46—was 
exactly the same as in the original informa-
the trial court's act was "inherently unfair," that 
the fine was "clearly excessive," or that no rea-
sonable person would accept the trial court's 
decision, State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 
(Utah Ct.App.1995), we find no abuse of discre-
tion. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-301.5(5) 
(1995) ("This [uniform fine schedule] does not 
prohibit the court from in its discretion imposing 
no fine, or a fine in any amount up to and 
including the maximum fine, for the offense.") 
We do not address McDonald's other argu-
ments as they are meritless. 
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tion; only the classification, and therefore 
the penalty, was changed. Thus, no addition-
al or different offense was charged in viola-
tion of Rule 4(d). However, McDonald ar-
gues amending the information violated a 
substantial right—her right to a jury trial— 
because Utah law provides for a jury trial 
when a defendant is charged with a misde-
meanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) 
(1995). Thus, according to McDonald, 
amending the information stripped her of her 
right to a jury trial under section 77-1-
6(2)(e) because once she was charged with an 
infraction, she no longer could request a jury 
trial under the statute. 
[5] It is well established that the right to 
a jury trial is triggered by the type of pun-
ishment a defendant faces. See, e.g., Lezvis 
v. U.S., — U.S. , , 116 S.Ct. 2163, 
2167, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996) (noting Su-
preme Court case-law has established that 
when defendant is charged with petty crime 
carrying maximum six month prison term, 
Constitution does not guarantee right to 
jury trial). Section 77-l-6(2)(e) reflects this 
general rule by providing for a jury trial 
except when a defendant is charged with an 
infraction and therefore cannot possibly be 
sentenced to prison. Once the charging in-
formation was amended to an infraction, Mc-
Donald faced no possibility of jail time and 
thus had no right to a jury trial. 
[6, 7] McDonald also argues the City had 
no right to charge her with an infraction 
when state law provides that the offense is a 
misdemeanor.2 We view the issue different-
ly. By accepting the amended information 
2. McDonald cites section 41-6-16, which re-
quires traffic laws to be enforced uniformly 
throughout the state See Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 -
6-16 (1993). However, this statute does not 
address the issue presented here—whether a trial 
court may allow an information charging a de-
fendant with a speeding violation to be amended 
from a misdemeanor to an infraction. 
3. We note the United States Supreme Court has 
not determined whether the right to a jury trial 
may be eliminated if a judge agrees before trial 
to impose a sentence of less than six months. 
See Lewis v. United States, U.S. , , 
116 S.Ct. 2163, 2168, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996) 
However, we need not address whether the 
judge's commitment to impose no jail time vio-
lated McDonald's Constitutional right to a jury in 
before trial, the trial court in effect agreed 
not to consider jail time as a possible sen-
tence for McDonald. The trial court's pre-
trial decision not to impose jail time and 
thereby eliminate McDonald's right to a jury 
trial is analogous to a trial court's pretrial 
decision not to impose jail time, thereby elim-
inating the defendant's right to appointed 
counsel. The United States Supreme Court 
has held that a defendant may be tried with-
out appointed counsel so long as that defen-
dant is not sentenced to jail. See Scott u 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 
1162, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979). Therefore un-
der Scott, if a trial court decides before trial 
not to impose jail time, the defendant has no 
right to appointed counsel. Cf. Layton City 
v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah CtApp. 
1997) (noting Scott applies after-the-fact test 
to determine if defendant had constitutional 
right to appointed counsel). Similarly, in 
this case, once the trial court agreed to elimi-
nate jail time from its sentencing options, it 
no longer was required under Utah law to 
grant McDonald's request for a jury trial.3 
II. Section 77-l-6(2)(e) 
[8-10] McDonald also asks us to find that 
section 77-l-6(2)(e)4 violates the Utah Con-
stitution because the Constitution provides 
for a jury trial in all criminal proceedings,5 
whereas section 77-l-6(2)(e) does not allow 
jury trials in infraction cases. After review-
ing the record, however, we find McDonald 
failed to properly raise this state constitu-
tional issue before the trial court. None of 
McDonald's motions before the trial court 
refers to this constitutional argument, nor is 
this case because that right did not attach since 
even a class C misdemeanor in Utah carries less 
than six months imprisonment. See infra, note 
6. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) (1995) pro-
vides: "No person shall be convicted unless by 
verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial 
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infrac-
tion, upon a judgment by a magistrate." (Em-
phasis added.) 
5. Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel [and] to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury.. ." 
STATE v. RAMIREZ 
Cite as 948 P.2d 375 (UtahApp. 1997) 
the argument raised in the court proceedings 
for which we have transcripts. When an 
appellant does not brief a state constitutional 
argument below, this court will not address 
it, but rather will analyze the alleged viola-
tion under the Federal Constitution. See 
State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993) ("Because appellants failed to 
develop any meaningful state constitutional 
argument below, our analysis must proceed 
solely under federal constitutional law."). 
[11-13] The United States Supreme 
Court has held that a defendant charged with 
a petty offense has no constitutional right to 
a jury trial. See, e.g., Lewis u United 
States, U.S.
 ; , 116 S.Ct. 2163, 
2166, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996). Further, "it is 
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now settled that a legislature's determination 
that an offense carries maximum prison 
terms of six months or less indicates its view 
that an offense is 'petty/ " Id. at , 116 
S.Ct. at 2167. Because an infraction carries 
no prison term under Utah law, it is a petty 
offense.6 Thus, section 77-l-6(2)(e) does not 
violate the right to a jury trial guaranteed 
under the Federal Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold the trial court's decision to allow 
the City to amend the information charging 
McDonald with a speeding violation from a 
class C misdemeanor to an infraction did not 
violate Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Further, we hold that when 
the trial court accepted the amended infor-
mation, it effectively agreed not to sentence 
McDonald to jail, and consequently Mc-
Donald did not have a right to a jury trial 
under Utah law. Finally, we conclude sec-
tion 77-l-6(2)(e) does not violate the right to 
a jury trial guaranteed by the Federal Con-
stitution. We therefore affirm McDonald's 
conviction. 
DAVIS, P.J., and WILKINS, Associate 
P.J., concur. 
/*\ . 
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6. We note that under United States Supreme 
Court case law, a class C misdemeanor in Utah is 
also a petty offense because it carries a maxi-
mum prison term of six months or less. There-
Defendant was convicted, in the Fifth 
District Court, St. George Department, 
James L. Shumate, J., of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute 
and arranging to distribute a controlled sub-
stance. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 924 P.2d 366, affirmed the convic-
tion but vacated the enhanced sentence and 
remanded for resentencing. On remand, the 
District Court imposed an enhanced sen-
tence. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Wilkins, Associate P.J., held that: 
(1) Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is not 
violated by statutory requirement that sen-
tencing judge, rather than jury, makes factu-
al determination as to whether offense was 
committed in concert with two or more peo-
ple, as required for sentence enhancement, 
and (2) evidence supported sentencing 
judge's finding that defendant acted in con-
cert with two other people in arranging to 
distribute controlled substance. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>1144.13(2.1) 
On appeal, facts are considered in light 
most favorable to jury's verdict. 
2. Criminal Law <S=>1144.17,1158(1) 
To successfully challenge sentencing 
judge's finding that defendant acted in con-
fore, McDonald would not have had a right to a 
jury trial under the Federal Constitution even if 
the trial court had not allowed the charging 
information to be amended to an infraction. 
